There is a long history of studying the epidemiology of computer malware. Much of this work has focused on the behaviors of specific viruses, worms, or botnets. In contrast, we seek to utilize an extension of the simple SIS model to examine the efficacy of various aggregate patching and recovery behaviors. We use the SIS model because we are interested in global prevalence of malware, rather than the dynamics, such as recovery, covered in previous work. We consider four populations: vigilant and non-vigilant with infected or not for both sets. We show, using our model and a real world data set, that small increases in patch rates and recovery speed are the most effective approaches to reduce system wide vulnerabilities due to unprotected computers. Our results illustrate that a public health approach may be feasible, as what is required is that a subpopulation adopt prophylactic actions rather than near-universal immunization.
INTRODUCTION
Studying the spread of computer malware through the use of epidemiological models has been a useful tool in understanding the dynamics of individual outbreaks of malware, as well as giving some insight into possible mitigation policies. Kephart and White's early work focusing on systemwide prevalence examined effects of topology on virus spread as well the possibility of a social response to infection [18, 19] . Other work has focused on describing the dynamics of individual types of viruses, worms, or botnets.
In Kephart and White's examination of the social response, even a small social response was able to reduce significantly the total level of infection in the system. However, this result depends on a system where the recovered population could not become infected. For this simulation we wanted to examine the effects of social response when it led to recovery, but this recovery did not protect the user from reinfection.
We use the results from these individual models, as well as larger data on websites hosting phishing sites to model system-wide properties of malware spread. We use these system-wide properties to draw analogies from public health research regarding the spread of sexually transmitted infections (STIs) to examine organizational patching policies. From these results, we argue that thinking of security problems in terms of public health policy is a good addition to more traditional mental models of security.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In the early work in adapting epidemiological models to computer viruses, the local nature of data transfer had to be taken into account. Computer viruses, in general, were spread very locally, and certain assumptions such as homogeneous population and the probability that an infected individual could infect any other individual in the susceptible population, did not hold [18] . In this environment Kephart and White (KW) adapted the SIS (Figure 1 ) model to a directed graph, to account for the non-homogeneous behavior of program sharing.
In their model, each computer is a vertex in a graph and an arc connects another computer in a program-exchange relationship. The arcs are associated with individual rates of infection and represent the set of vertices that can be infected by a given vertex, while each vertex is given an individual rate of recovery. Once a vertex has recovered, it is immediately capable of being reinfected. This, as the authors state, represents a very simple assumption that users will not become more vigilant after being infected. While this is a simple assumption, it seems to be a fairly good approximation for real world data [29] . Their deterministic calculations correspond to early results in prevalence driven epidemiological models [20] , but failed to capture the social or organizational aspects of dealing with virus spreads. They modified their model to include a social response, or, as they call it, a kill switch model. That is, each computer, upon discovery and cleaning, alerts all other computers it is connected to to alert them of possible infection [19] . This extension (Figure 2 ) assumes that recovery corresponds to a temporary immunization from the virus [19] . Based on these model extensions, KW show that central reporting and response to an incident is important to containing the incident. With central reporting and response, even if an organization is above the epidemic threshold, an incident can be limited in size and duration [19] .
systems to become quarantined, removing them from the susceptible and infectious populations [45] . They demonstrated that removing computers from both populations for some amount time was an effective mitigating factor [45] . However, as Serazzi and Zanero point out in their later work on Sapphire, quarantines would be difficult to implement, as infected hosts cannot be trusted to quarantine themselves [36] . Zou and Towsley revisited their earlier work to demonstrate that the increased range of addresses in IPv6 would effectively reduce the total prevalence of routing worms such as Sapphire. This, they show, is due to scanning worms inability to access significant parts of the IPv6 address space in a reasonable amount of time [43] .
Moore et.al.'s data collection and description of the explosive growth of the Sapphire worm required further modifications to earlier models [27] . While Code-Red generally followed standard models, Sapphire spread fast enough to become bandwidth limited, which in turn, limited its total ability to spread [27] . Serazzi and Zanero designed a model that encoded network resources. Utilizing incoming and outgoing traffic rates into their model, they were able to capture the Sapphire's aggressive scanning. This scanning choked the Internet and greatly impeded Sapphire's rate of growth [36] . Serazzi and Zanero also point out the difficulty in implementing global security policies such as quarantines and hub immunizations.
Staniford, Paxson, and Weaver, contribute an excellent summary of many of the modeling attempts and call for a CDC for computer malware [39] . We agree with this model of thinking, and the data collected via their suggested sensors and analysis would be useful for further mitigation of online pathogens. However, the focus of this paper is more on the effects of risk takers on the total prevalence of contagion. Thus, we hope to show that a small group of users engaged in risky behavior creates a threat to the risk adverse population.
To this end we look primarily at August and Tunca's work on allowing users with illegal copies of software to patch [5] and Choi, Fershtman, and Gandal's work on cost of patching [14] . While August and Tunca focus primarily on whether or not firms should allow users of illegal copies to patch, Choi, Fershtman, and Gandal look at the costs associated with different user's and their willingness to patch. We combine both the pirates in August and Tunca's work, with the nonpatching populations of Choi, Fershtman, and Gandal, to show that limitations on user's ability to maintain a secure system is dangerous to the risk adverse population.
Models of sexually transmitted diseases have become very complicated to deal the the multiple population interactions [12, 17] . However, most multiple population models do not couple the behavioral changes that occur do individual's perceptions of disease spread [33] . We build off of Perra et al.'s work to create a two population model with a social response that represents the ability of users to change behavior, and thus, their population group. This differentiates our model from more complicated models of STIs that use different characteristics of infection for individual population groups, but do not include behavioral responses to infection [11, 34, 37, 6 ]. 
Model Creation
Kephart and White's social response model (KW) demonstrates the effectiveness of social responses to computer infection. We extend their model to allow the possibility of infection in the inoculated population. This extension includes aspects of Wang et. al.'s vigilance model [41] . Similar to their approach, we view user vigilance as prevalence based response to the infectious population, with vigilant users returning to the more susceptible population at a constant rate.
Wang et. al. assume that user vigilance declines after an initial peak due to responses to new infections [41] . Rather than using delay differential equations to model the decrease in vigilance, we make vigilance reliant on the infectious population, and separate vigilant and non-vigilant users into different compartments. Users return to the non-vigilant population at a constant rate, which we feel represents the effects of cost incurred due to maintenance of a secure system. Another option would be to have the return rate inversely proportional to the infected population: The larger the infectious population, the slower vigilant users return to the non-vigilant population.
Since we are modeling the diffusion of malware, the individual behaviors are of limited use. We are more interested in equillibrium states. Thus, the more common SIR type models previously used for models of malware infection are not useful for our purposes. This assumption better captures the long-term behavior seen in malware such as the Blaster worm [7] as well as the persistent insecurities found in web servers that allow them to be reinfected [29] .
The model we propose ( Figure 3 and Equation 1) is a modified version of an SIS model with two interacting subpopulations. Our model does not assume immunity in the Sa population. This represents the fact that no security system is 100% effective at stopping all vulnerabilities. We do not find, in the course of our analysis, that the rates of infection in the resistant population are so low that they may be ignored.
Our model also assumes a well-mixed, homogeneous population. This is, in many ways, an unrealistic assumption, given the patterns of connection displayed by social networks and browsing behavior [26] . Moreover, it distracts from our metaphor of STIs, in that it assumes that all users are equally likely to interact with one another, rather than rely on contact patterns [15] . However, the dissemination of many online attacks is based on random scanning, which creates a scaled version of a well-mixed, homogeneous population [18] . Thus, this is a useful simplifying assumption, but can be expanded upon in future work. η and δ govern the transitions between the two population groups. η represents the response of non-vigilant users to a given level of global infection. The higher η is, the faster non-vigilant users secure their systems. δ governs the response to the cost of maintaining a secure system. This is a constant rate, and the higher δ is, the less accepting users become of the cost, driving them to become insecure at a faster rate.
Parameter Definitions
βr, µr, βa, and µa 2 are the infection spread parameters for the non-vigilant and vigilant populations, respectively. βr and βa govern how fast an infection spreads, while µr and µa 2 dictate how quickly a user recovers. Recovery could be a simple as deleting an infected file, or as complex as reinstalling an OS. We assume that βr > βa and µr < µa 2 to represent the fact that users that are maintaining a secure system will be less likely to become infected and more likely to recover. γa 1 and γa 2 embed the response to social pressure to recover in the non-vigilant and vigilant populations, respectively. Users responding to these parameters, but not to µr or µa 2 do not scan their systems for potential threats, but respond when an entity they know alerts them to a possible threat. For example, a user may respond to a Firefox reminder to update their browser or the exhortation of a friend. A specific instance of this was Google's effort to alert users to possible infections on their computers [21] . This is less than ideal for maintaining a secure system, as, with limited contact, infections can persist. 
Parameter Analysis
This model can be made equivalent to Kephart and White's "kill switch" model ( Figure 2 ) by setting δ = 0.01, β = 0.5, µa 1 = 0.1, and γ1 = 0.05 and all other parameters to 0. We use both the Kephart and White (KW) model and a standard SIS model to compare our model under different parameter conditions. This allows us to evaluate which parameters may be realistic and useful.
Parameter Analysis in Vigilant Population Only
We first analyze the various effects of adjusting the parameters on the vigilant population to identify the most important parameters in controlling infection in that population. From there we move to analyzing the whole system, individually adjusting certain parameters to identify the key parameters in the system as a whole. For these simulations we vary one parameter and keep others constant. For each of the parameters we hold constant: βa, µa 2 , and γa 2 , we set them to 0.5, 0.1, .01 respectively.
These parameters are taken directly from KW and varied in later simulations. This sets a fixed social response at 1/10 the level of the cleaning response. This allows us to maintain consistency with our system-wide analysis below. We then vary the parameters of interest for each simulation from 0 to 1 by .01. Because we are only working with Sa, we initialize the populations to: Sr = 0, Sa = 0.99, I = 0, Ia = 0.01. Without an infected population Ir or Ia, no further infections are possible in this model.
Parameter Analysis with Both Populations
The system parameter analysis keeps the infection rate and cleaning rate in the non-security aware population at the same level as the standard SIS model used by KW (β = 0.5 and µr 1 = 0.1). This reduces the number of variables we must examine, and provides us with a reasonable worst case scenario of eighty percent of non-vigilant computers infected. However, we adjust the security aware population to reflect a greater vigilance.
We set the infection rate of Sa to half of the non-vigilant population's rate. Similarly, the cleaning rate of Sa is twice that found in the non-vigilant populations. In the vigilant population, there is a social response, but this is 1/10th the cleaning rate. This leads to the following parameter values: (βa = 0.25, µa 2 = 0.2, and γa 2 = 0.02). We normalize the initial populations to Sr = 0.99, Sa = 0, I = 0.01, Ia = 0.
Moreover, these parameter values are a reasonable estimation of actual global prevalence. Our intial parameter values in isolated populations lead to roughly 80% of the population falling into the non-vigilant population, and roughly 80% of that population infected. Within the vigilant population, the initial parameter values lead to roughly 13% of that population infected. With no interactions between the populations, this leads to a global prevalence of roughly 77%. These results correspond to estimates of global prevalence.
In their report to the House of Lords in 2007, the Science and Technology Committe reported on results from an earlier study that showed that roughly 80% computers lacked neccesary security measures, and roughly 72% of sampled systems had some type of malware [35] . However, the committee noted that this study only sampled 354 computers, so it probably was not an accurate portrayal of the actual prevalence of malware. 
Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis
The first two sets of analysis represent a very crude sensitivity analysis given the number of parameters. We analyze each parameter in light of a fixed system. This reduces the problem from a nine dimensional problem to a one dimensional one. However, it is not informative in terms of how the parameters interact with one another. To address this, we performed two types of sensitivity analysis in two situations.
We applied used Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) on the set of all parameters to measure both epistemic uncertainty and to perform a sensitivty analysis of the parameters given the measured value of total infectious computers [10] . LHS first samples from prior distributions of parameter values and generates sampled output for the number of samples.
In our case, we used 1000 samples. This gives us our uncertainty analysis as we examine the variability of outputs as we vary the parameter values. From there LHS use a ranktransform correlation coefficient to measure the sensitivity of each parameter as it pertains to the measured output [10] .
We used uniform priors for all parameter values, given our own uncertainty of acceptable distributions. Our initial test was performed over all parameters and used to identify the key bifurcation parameters [25] . These bifurcation parameters are key to differentiating the major equillibrium behavior in the system; mainly, whether a contagion is maintained or dies out. After we identified the key bifurcation parameters, we set them to ensure continued prevalence and performed the analysis again. This allowed us to do uncertainty and sensitivity analysis of the secondary parameters associated with reducing prevalence.
Model Fitting
To fit our model to data we used MATLAB's lsqcurvefit function to fit the cumulative sum of the infected risk takers and risk adverse populations to the cumulative sum of the observed data. All parameters, as well as the initial population values, had a lower bound of 0 and upper bound of 1. The population values were normalized to 1 before computation. We took our total population to be 150,000 based on the cumulative sum of the total number of attacks. We ran each fit 50 times to try to avoid local minima.
We fit our model to the top ten companies targeted by phishing scams. This data contains observed websites spoofing legitimate businesses such as banks and other online commerce. This does not represent the social aspect of the attack, but rather the infrastructure used to support such attacks. We also fit our model to the total number of attacks for those companies.
To identify the top ten targeted entities, we cleaned the data to attempt to get unique identifiers. We found that, for the most part, our cleaning manage to capture most of the necessary data, but it can be refined for a more accurate picture. However, that being said, the top ten targeted entities account for 130559 out of 157355 observed attacks, roughly 83% of the total observed attacks.
RESULTS
We examined the effects of parameter variation in different phases. We first wanted to see if there was a way to reduce total infection prevalence by adjusting only the parameters associated with the vigilant population. After considering only the vigilant population, we investigated the effects of making the non-vigilant population respondent to the vigilant population.
We conducted this investigation by adjusting the µa 1 and γa 1 parameters to investigate the effect of a user's ability to recover to more secure behavior. We then adjusted the parameters that determined the speed of transition to and from the vigilant population (η and δ) in uninfected users. When the infection is less potent in vigilant users, we can reduce the total infected population by having more users become vigilant and having vigilant users stay vigilant longer. For these simulations we do not adjust the infection or clean rates, but keep the non-vigilant and vigilant population parameters at their fixed rates discussed above.
Effects of Adjusting Parameters in Vigilant Population Only
In KW's model of social response, they add a prevalence driven recovery effect on top of the standard, constant rate recovery. In order to investigate the effects of this recovery in the population we varied the social response in the vigilant population only, to see if it would lead to significant reduction in the equilibrium of total infected. Since we split the model into two subpopulations, we could also examine source of the infections.
Simulation 1
In Kephart and White's examination of the social response, even a small social response was able to reduce the total level of infection in the system. However, this relied on a system where the recovered population could not become infected. For this simulation we wanted to examine the effects of social response when it led to recovery, but this recovery did not protect the user from reinfection. We set the infection characteristics in the vigilant population to correspond to KW's model (βa = 0.5 and µ 2 = 0.1) and varied γa 2 .
Looking at the results ( Figure 4 ) we find that only when the combination of social response and cleaning rate is greater than the infection rate does the infection die off. That is, Figure 4 : Comparison between SIS, KW, and Our Model, γa 2 variable. Only when γa 2 reaches high rates relative to βa does R∞ a fall.
These results mean that the total social response and the cleaning rate must effect the network at the same rate as the malware to be effective at eliminating its spread. For a single population then, social response is a useful measure in reducing the total infection rate, but is unlikely to be able to reduce the infection from a pandemic unless either the cleaning rate or the social response is unreasonably high. For example, the dynamic characteristics of Conficker.C described by Antonakakis et.al., could be considered a pandemic infection [4] As we will see, when we look at Simulation 9, the social response that allows non-vigilant to become vigilant, γa 1 is an key ingredient to reducing the total R∞. In our model a shift for the vigilant to the non-vigilant population is associated with an increase in the rate of social patching. An increase in the expense of recovery decreases the vigilant population and thus decreases the presumptive efficacy of social recovery. Moreover, since γa 1 is prevalence driven and δ is constant, any amount of shifting is able to produce some amount of prevalent vigilant population.
Simulation 2
In Simulation 2 we varied the cleaning rate in the vigilant population. Without any cleaning rate, even in the presence of a social response, R∞ = 1. In fact, when µa = 0, the bifurcation point becomes βa γa 2 = 1, and when
This means that, within a given population, the recovery rate is the most important aspect for reducing total infection.
Moreover, if we compare the results from Simulation 1 with Simulation 2 ( Figure 5 ), as well as the bifurcation analysis, we note that without some sort of cleaning rate, social response is unable to reduce the total infected population on its own unless its rate of response is higher than the rate of infection. This means that only social responses without a systematic cleaning or recovery policy merely reduce the rate of spread, but not the overall infection equilibrium. This offers an explanation for the continuing existence of, for example, the long past Blaster worm [7] . Whether or not increasing the rate of social response to the level that it can be effective depends upon the topologies of the malware spread and social response. Enhancing social response is the focus of related human subjects research in progress. Exploring different malware diffusion and network topologies is the subject of future research.
Simulation 3
Simulation 3 is the complementary analysis to γa 2 . There is no pandemic outbreak if βa − γa 2 < µa 2 . In practical terms, reducing βa corresponds to user behavior, rather than cleaning/recovery of systems, as represented by µa 2 . Examples of this include protected browsing, keeping a system up to date, or other security measures.
We see that, obviously, βa is an important part of the infection. One thing that is noticable in our simulations is that βa need not be very high to achieve a relatively high R∞. 
Effects of Adjusting A Single Parameters in Both Populations
For this set of analyses, we adjusted a single parameter in both vigilant and non-vigilant populations and investigated how it affected the R∞ for the entire population. This allows us to study the global effect of a given parameter. The first three simulations examine the effects of behavior changes in the vigilant population. The final simulations study the interactions between the two uninfected populations governed by η and δ. We find that the principle way to reduce R∞ is to allow infected individuals to recover to the vigilant population. Comparison between SIS, KW, and Our Model, γa 2 variable. Increasing the social response rate does reduce R∞, but even at extreme values, γa 2 is unable to significantly reduce R∞ due to the effects of the large infected non-vigilant population.
Simulation 4
In this simulation we adjust the social response parameter in the vigilant population. This allows us to see how increasing the parameters in vigilant population has on the system-wide R∞ (Figure 7 ). We notice, as in the following two simulations, increasing the responses in the vigilant population does little to reduce the total R∞.
The dynamic relationship between γa 2 and R∞ is a bit more complicated in this simulation, as this simulation contains an Ir value that is non-zero, and transitions between the populations. We are holding µa 1 = 0 and γ1 = 0, so we know that the relationship between η = 0.05 and δ = 0.04 gives us an approximate 80-20 split between security conscious users and those that are unable or unwilling to engage in more secure behaviors. We also know that when γa 2 + µa 2 > βa, R∞ a = 0, in an isolated situation.
However, even when γa 2 = 1, we still end up with an infected vigilant population. In this case, R∞ a ≈ 0.072, while R∞ r ≈ .6. R∞ a = 0.072 represents approximately 31% of the vigilant population, while R∞ r ≈ .6 is approximately 77% of the non-vigilant population. Recall Figure 4 that illustrated that with only a vigilant population γa 2 = 1 should remove all contagion within the vigilant population. Thus, the infections within the vigilant population are being driven by the non-vigilant population.
Simulation 5
In this simulation we adjusted the cleaning rate within the vigilant population. The key result here is if R∞ a > R∞ r , R∞ a drives the total R∞ (Figure 8 ). However, this is unlikely, as it is improbable that vigilant users will become infected at a greater rate than non-vigilant users. While, if R∞ a < R∞ r , but γa 2 + µa 2 < βa, the infection is driven by both vigilant and non-vigilant populations. In the case where R∞ a < R∞ r , and γa 2 + µa 2 > βa, the infections in the security aware population are due to the prevalence of infectious non-vigilant systems.
For example, when µa 2 = 0, there is no cleaning and the social response cannot reduce the spread of the infection within the vigilant population. Thus, R∞ a = 1. At the end of the 1700 time steps in our simulation, R∞ = 1, with most of it (99.998%) being made up of the "vigilant" population. This suggests that the vigilant population cannot rely merely on protective measures to avoid infection, but must also be diligent in actively monitoring and maintaining their 
Simulation 6
This simulation adjusted the βa parameter to investigate how allowing the vigilant population to reduce, or increase its infection rate would affect the system-wide R∞. Given the parameter values for µa 2 , as βa increases to 1, the vigilant populations dynamics approach those of the non-vigilant population. Hence the convergence to R∞ = 0.8, as βa goes to 1 ( Figure 9 ).
What is interesting about this simulation is, if our recovery and social response parameters were such that the reproduction rate of the vigilant population were greater than the non-security aware population, it would pull the system to a total R∞ a , as users would flee the infectious environment of the non-vigilant group, to the even more hostile vigilant group.
Simulation 7
For this simulation, we varied η to see how increases in the response rate of non-security users in the face of infection impacted R∞. Recall that η represents a user's ability to transition from non-vigilant, to vigilant, to reduce the likelihood of infection, in the face of an impending infection. Obviously, when η = 0, there is no transition to the security aware population, and the model behaves as a standard SIS model as shown in Figure 10 .
However, when η > 0, the model behaves in an interesting manner. It is possible to see that increasing η reduces the system-wide R∞ (Figure 10 ). But, there is a complex relationship going on between η and R∞ a . As seen in Table  4 .2.4 and Figure 10 , while the total R∞ is decreasing, the R∞ a increases until 0.6 < η < 0.7, when it begins to decrease. It is also possible to see that R∞ a , while increasing Table 2 : Interaction between η and R∞ a in those intervals, is always decreasing as a percentage of the vigilant population.
η pulls more of the total population into the vigilant population, but, until it is able to overcome the increasingly small non-vigilant population, that population still exerts a growing cost on the vigilant population. This result is important, since it indicates that even a small population engaged in risk behavior, with limited opportunity to reduce their risk, threatens a larger, risk averse population.
When η δ, it is unable to pull R∞ to R∞ a in the isolated system case. Yet even an η as low as 0.1, is capable of reducing R∞ more than any of the test values of βa, µa 2 , or γa 2 . This suggests that if modifying η is feasible, it would have a significant impact on global malware presence.
Simulation 8
In this simulation we varied the other part of the transitions from non-vigilant to security. δ represents the constant rate of relapse where users view the costs of maintaining security may not be worth it. Reducing δ represents increasing a users willingness to engage in more secure behavior, while increasing δ represents users that are only willing to be vig- ilant in the face of large outbreaks.
What becomes immediately apparent is that when δ = 0, R∞ approaches R∞ a (Figure 11 ). However, δ = 0, while ideal, is unlikely. It represents a population that is fully vigilant, irrespective of cost. We can see that reducing δ from 0.04 to 0.01, results in R∞ ≈ .549, which is lower than the R∞ achievable by extreme values in βa, µa 2 , or γa 2 . It is unlikely that such lack of sensitivity is realistically achievable, though it is probably reasonable to assume that η and δ are of the same order of magnitude.
Simulation 9
In this simulation we investigate the ability of users to recover to a vigilant population through social response, rather than merely recovering to the standard susceptible population. γa 1 represents non-vigilant users' ability to respond to social pressure applied by non-infected vigilant users, not just to clean their machines, but to also, at least for some time, to become vigilant users.
In KW's social response model, γa 1 is kept to 1/10 of standard cleaning rate, but is effective at reducing R∞ due to the lack of infection rate in the recovered population, and the inability to recover directly back to the susceptible population [19] . We concur with their assumption, in terms of limiting the social response rate. However, it is important to note how effective increases in γa 1 are at controlling width of the infection peak curve, and mitigating R∞. Arguably, γa 1 should be limited in regards to β and µ, it may be, that given certain network topologies, even a relatively low γa 1 will still be effective at reducing R∞.
Simulation 10
In our final simulation, we vary µa 1 , the parameter representing cleaning a computer and adapting vigilant behavior. For example, a user reinstalling an OS and applying patches and installing AV software, rather than just removing malware and hoping to avoid infection in the future. When µa 1 = 0, users are unable to become vigilant users until they clean their computers and respond to the infection through η. µa 1 > 0 means that users have some method to recover directly to vigilant behavior. µa 1 is not as effective as γa 1 at limiting the duration of the infection peak, but it does limit the peak's height, limiting the total infections. Moreover, µa 1 is effective at low parameter values. µa 1 = 0.05, or 1/10 β, reduces R∞ = .451, nearly half the R∞ of the standard SIS model, and without adjusting any other parameters. This suggests that providing users with the ability to recover to updated and secured software/machines, should be a key component in any campaign to limit global prevalence of malware.
Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis
We used Latin hypercube sampling to examine both the epistemic uncertainty of the model, as well as the sensitivity of output variation to parameter variation [25] . The first step in LHS is to sample the parameter space to create a collection of measured outputs based on those samples. We did this sampling twice: first with all parameters sampled, followed by fixed values for the identified bifurcation parameters. In both cases we sampled the parameter space 1000 times. Our output of interest was total infection prevalence ( Figures 15 and 16 ).
Since the output of interest varies over time, so too does the uncertainty. Thus, we created output probability distributions for each time step that we observed. The data that we later analyzed spans 100 days, so we looked at the first 100 time steps in our model.
The key result of our uncertainty analysis is how often the model settles into an equillibrium state with no infection. In the case when all parameters are varied, this occurs roughly 70% of the time by day 20 ( Figure 17) , and when the bifurcation parameters are fixed, that percentage hovers around 60%, though it takes a bit longer to reach that level ( Figure  18 ). This means that, even with the key bifurcation parameters fixed to ensure prevalence outside the impact of other parameters, the vast majority of parameter combinations lead to no prevalence. It is easy for the recovery parameters to overcome the infection parameters in most cases due to the number of recovery parameters.
The results from the sensitivity analysis are equally interesting. Figure 19 shows the changing sensitivity of each parameter as time progresses. In the initial stages of the infection, social response and recovery from risk takers to the risk adverse population is more important than recovery within the risk adverse population. However, it rapidly loses its importance on overall prevalence, while risk adverse recovery increases its importance as time progresses.
All three of the standard recovery parameters (µx) are of approximately the same importance in the long term reduction of prevalence. However, the infection rate in the risk adverse group (βP ) loses its sensitivity gradually. The transmissions between susceptible risk takers and susceptible risk adverse (η and δ) are not significant in terms of affecting the global prevalence of a contagion, just as social response within the risk adverse community (γ2).
When we fix the main bifurcation parameters (βr = 0.5, βa = 0.25, µr 1 = 0.1, µa 1 = 0.01, and µa 2 = 0.02), however, we get a better view of the effects of the social parameters. When all parameters are varied, γ1 is significant parameter for reducing prevalence in the initial stages of a contagion, while γ2 is never significant. However, when a contagion exists, we find that both of the social response recovery rates are important, at least until the later stages of a contagion, moreso than the transfer from susceptible risk takers to susceptible risk adverse (Figure 20 ).
Fitting the Model to Data
In our examination of the data we sorted each attack based on what online entity a given website was spoofing. We tabulated the total number of attacks on each entity to find the top ten targets of observed attacks. These attacks have a heavy tail distribution ( Figure 14 , and seem to confirm Maillart and Sornette's work [24] , but lower ranked entities still create large jitters in the overall behavior.
We normalized the SSE to the minimum error across all fits and companies when we plotted the fits. Due to the complex interactions of the parameters, while the model can fit the data, often times the parameter values do not make sense. Thus, the uncertainty and sensitivity analyses are more important to this analysis, than the fit. However, the fits are useful to see how the model can represent real world data, and demonstrate the long term prevalence of attacks.
The model fits are found in Section A.3. The key results found in our model fits is that, while our model can handle the baseline prevalence of attacks in many cases ( Figure  (21) , it cannot handle abrupt spikes in contagion behavior ( Figure 35 ). This suggests that we need to have some further refinement to our model. Ideally, we would like to consider better representations of contact patterns, but also the exploration of birth/death rates, representing new computers entering the network and older computers being shut off.
DISCUSSION
In Section 6 we reify the conclusions of the ten simulations described in this work. In this section we discuss the possible implications of our findings. That extreme changes in βa have little effect in the equilibrium state of an infection is an encouraging result. The rate of spread of an infection is one variable completely subject to the control of the attacker. Therefore great efficacy in changes in beta would imply that defense could be ultimately futile.
Increasing the roughly equivalent variable, µa, is found to be as ineffective as βa in decreasing the global prevalence of infection. However, there are a significant caveats. The outcome assumes that the malware will remain endemic with a roughly constant β and that recovery does not result in immunity to a particular malware component. Yet given the existence of multiple malware attacks, the use of multiple vectors for a single malware variant, the lack of broad immunity upon recovery, and the potential for malware to evolve these are not unreasonable assumptions.
Individuals choosing the recover due to social pressure (which includes automated pressure, such as Firefox exhortations to upgrade) must be faster than the rate at the virus is spreading. This is an extremely unlikely case. Yet the social recovery rate, γa 1 , is one of the most effective measures in altering the equilibrium when there are two populations (vigilant and otherwise). However, increasing the response rate in the vigilant population has little effect on the global equilibrium. This is a mixed result given that it is arguably easier to alter a response rate in an aware population, but even modest gains in response of the unaware population can significantly reduce the global prevalence.
Transfer rates between the two populations is the most efficacious strategy for reducing long-term equilibrium. This argues that small increases in vigilance can result in significant increases in outcomes. Thus the title of the paper where increased use of healthy behaviors (e.g., contraception use or smoking cessation) can greatly reduce unintended consequences over the population as a whole. Compared this to situations where the entire population must engage in healthy behaviors (e.g., immunization) to result in significant outcomes. This argues for an approach that is closer to risk communication than mandates. Luckily, risk communication is feasible while global mandates are not.
Users must be able to act upon available information, e.g., δ should be quite low. The requires an ease of access to the resources necessary to engage in more secure behavior. Within the public health sector, barriers to treatment and preventative measures have been shown to greatly increase overall costs. For example, Franzini et.al., estimated a likely additional cost of $43.6 million in a one year period in Texas, if adolescents were required to notify parents when they received reproductive health care [16] . This suggests that allowing access to security patches, even in the case of illegal copies, would be effective in lowering system-wide costs, though offering those patches may not be profit maximizing for a given firm [22] .
Moreover, risk communication, when combined with access to treatment resources, has been effective in reducing prevalence in the public health sector. Spain et.al. demonstrated the effectiveness of at risk communication at recruiting at risk groups to utilize reproductive and preventative health care [38] . Several studies demonstrate the effectiveness of Youth Peer Education services at referring at risk populations to appropriate clinics [23, 13] . When coupled with a voucher system for care, use of clinics increases dramatically [9] . Thus, there are extant systems of response and information that we can take advantage of in regards to encouraging more secure behavior.
The difference between the two populations are rate of recovery (µ), responsive to social pressure (γ) and decreased rate of infection (β). Therefore the findings above, of lack of efficacy of contact rate in the risk adverse population (βa), social recovery rate (γa 2 ), and recovery rate (µa 2 ) are due primarily to the infectous interaction that the risk adverse population exerts as well as the interactions between these variables and the ability to become risk adverse before infection (δ) and difficulty to remain risk adverse (η). In future work we will extend the model to include this feedback.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we created and examined the parameters of two-population SIS epidemiological model in regards to global prevalence of malware. The two populations, vigilant, and non-security aware, interact in many different ways ( Figure  3 ), which affects R∞, to equilibrium infected population. We examined single parameter variations within the vigilant population and the system as a whole to identify key components to addressing the spread of malware.
In our first set of simulations, we examined the vigilant population in isolation, seeking to identify the most effective parameter for reducing or removing malware in that population. We found that, within the single population it was possible to completely eliminate malware spread by setting µa 2 + γa 2 > βa. We also showed that adjusting the recovery rate µa 2 is the most effective way to reduce R∞ in the vigilant population.
In our second set of simulations, we looked at the entire system and tried to find which parameters were effective at reducing global R∞, while keeping the infection and recovery rates (β and µ) in the non-vigilant population constant.
Here we find that, while we could eliminate the spread of infection within the vigilant population by overcoming the infection rate, adjusting the vigilant parameters had little effect on R∞, and infections in the non-vigilant population drove the infections. However, when we examined the parameters governing transitions from non-vigilant to vigilant, we discovered several possibilities for infection control.
When we evaluated the transitions between uninfected nonvigilant and uninfected vigilant populations, we found that, while η was effective at making more users vigilant, even a small population of infected non-vigilant users could negatively impact the vigilant population. Similarly, when we prevented users from returning to the non-vigilant population, we could limit the infection spread to R∞ a . Yet, this represents an unrealistic expectation of inelasticity (i.e., all users demanding secure behavior, regardless of cost).
Examing the parameters governing the recovery of infected non-vigilant to uninfected security aware, we find that allowing users to clean and repair their systems with updated and secure software is the most effective way at managing global prevalence of malware infection. Even at low levels, the ability to recover to the risk adverse population ( 
